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In the last several years, the creation of an international competition
law regime has gained renewed attention. This is primarily due to the glob-
alization of businesses and the difficulties national competition regulators
have experienced in policing business activity in the new economy. Pro-
posals for some form of supranational competition law have been around
since the League of Nations in the first part of the prior century. Although
none of these proposals has been implemented, the "antitrust international-
ists"1 have not given up hope despite significant reservations expressed by
the United States.
The proposals concerning international competition law have tradition-
ally been focused on cartel behavior rather than structural restraints of com-
petition. Given the political value of merger approval decisions, it was
apparent that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve an interna-
tional consensus on the control of mergers. Recently, however, attention
has shifted to the possible regulation of cross-border mergers and acquisi-
tions. This attention is attributable to the high-profile cases such as the
1998 acquisition of McDonnell Douglas by Boeing which created signifi-
cant political conflict.2 The potential public and private benefits of estab-
* Attorney, Gardner Carton & Douglas, Chicago, Illinois; Adjunct Professor, Northwest-
ern University School of Law.
'See Eleanor M. Fox, International Antitrust: Cosmopolitan Principles for an Open
World, Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Corp. L. Inst. 1998, 271 (1999); Eleanor M.
Fox, Toward World Antitrust and Market Access, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1997); Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann, International Competition Rules for the GATT-MTO World Trade and Legal
System, 27 J. WORLD TRADE 35 (1993); James T. Halverson, Harmonization and Coordina-
tion of International Merger Procedures, 60 ANTrTRuST L.J. 531 (1991).2See Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust Regulation Across National Borders: The United States
of Boeing versus the European Union of Airbus, 16(1) BROOKINGs REV. 30 (Winter 1998).
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lishing an international merger control regime are attracting the attention of
scholars, 3 practitioners4 and regulators.5 The new proposals seek to address
the additional public and private costs which are incurred as a result of
overlapping national merger control regimes by creating some degree of
harmonization and, in some cases, an international merger control authority
with jurisdiction over cross-border transactions.
Although this paper follows on those new proposals, and addresses
many of the same problems, the international merger control regime pro-
posed here fundamentally differs in its approach. Although there is cer-
tainly a beneficial role for an international institution in merger control, the
current proposals are too ambitious. Instead of focussing on the allocation
of cross-border transactions, this paper suggests that the focus should be on
the cases which present no treat to competition, and yet are scrutinized by
several different national competition law regulators. An international in-
stitution, probably within the framework of the World Trade Organization
("WTO"), 6 should be created to identify those jurisdictions where a par-
ticular concentration does not have a potential effect on competition. The
proposal is based on the observation that there is a significant number of
transactions which present no real threat to competition but nonetheless, be-
cause of the merger control thresholds employed by national merger control
regimes, must be notified in and reviewed by regulatory agencies in several
countries. Since most merger control regimes rely on sales volumes to de-
lineate their sphere of application, competition regulators expend substan-
tial resources reviewing transactions which present no real threat to
competition. In addition, the firms involved in the transaction must commit
substantial amounts of time and money to comply with such regimes. The
idea presented here is to create an international merger control regime in the
context of the WTO which would benefit both the parties and the national
regulators and, at the same time, stand a realistic chance of being imple-
mented.
HI. THE NEED FOR AN INTERNATIONAL MERGER CONTROL REGIME
A. Globalization and Overlapping Merger Control Jurisdiction
One of the greatest challenges facing international antitrust is the high
degree of jurisdictional overlap which exists between national competition
3 Eleanor M. Fox, Can We Control Merger Control? - An Experiment, POL'Y DIRECTIONS
FOR GLOBAL MERGER REV. 79 (1999).
4Michael Reynolds, EU and U.S. Merger Control Procedural Harmonisation, POL'Y
DICTIONs FOR GLOBAL MERGER REV. 109 (1999); Halverson, supra note 1.5 Frederic Jenny, International Merger Control, POL'Y DIRECTIONS FOR GLOBAL MERGER
REV. 91 (1999).
6Global Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act Em-
bodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994).
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law systems, and in particular, merger control regimes.7 The controversy
between the United States and the European Union over antitrust approval
of the acquisition of McDonnell Douglas by Boeing is sometimes cited as
an example of why an international regime should be created.8 There are
three factors which have contributed to the increase in overlap. The first
factor is clearly the globalization of business. The process of globalization
generally refers to the increase in cross-border trade and investment due
largely to the reduction of traditional barriers to such activities? In 1998,
for example, world-wide exports of merchandise and commercial services
amounted to $6.5 trillion.10 Since competition law jurisdiction is generally
based upon the territoriality principle,' the geographic expansion of busi-
ness activity, either by direct investment or exports, increases the potential
exposure to multiple competition law systems. When MCI merged with
WorldCom in 1997, for example, over 30 agencies reviewed the transac-
tion. 1
2
Another factor contributing to the increase in the jurisdictional overlap
between competition law systems is the increase in the number of countries
which have adopted competition law systems. Many countries in Latin
America13 and Eastern Europe 14 have adopted some form of competition
7The concept of jurisdictional overlap refers merely to the application of two or more
sets of national competition laws to the same transaction or activity.
8Fox, supra note 2; Alexander Schaub, International co-operation in antitrust matters:
making the point in the wake of the Boeing/MDD proceedings, 1998/1 EC COMPETITION
POLICY NEWSLETTER 2, 4 ("A multilateral (for instance within the WTO) or bilateral arbitra-
tion mechanism (and to a greater degree a global antitrust authority), which would allow us
to resolve case related conflicts and go beyond limitations imposed by the necessity for each
competition authority to implement its own legal rules and to take primarily account of the
specific market conditions and the consumer interests in the territory it polices, is inconceiv-
able under the current circumstances.").
9See generally MALCOM WATERS, GLOBALIZATION (1995); JOHN H. DuNNING, THE
GLOBALIZATION OF BusINEss: THE CHALLENGE OF THE 1990s (1993).
'
0 World Trade Growth Slower in 1998 After Unusually Strong Growth in 1997, WTO
Press Release, April 16, 1999 available at <http://www.wto.org/wto/intltradlintemat.htm>.
" Cases 89, 104, 114, 116-7, 125-9/85, Ahlstr6m v. Commission, 1988 E.C.R. 5193 para.
18; F.A. Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law, Il1 Recueil des Cours 9,
100 (1964); Wemer Meng, Extraterrirotiale Jurisdiktion im 6ffentlichen Wirtschaftsrecht
(1994).
12Adam Frederickson, A Strategic Approach to Multi-jurisdictional Filings, 4 Eur. Coun-
sel 23 (Dec. 1999/Jan. 2000).
13William E. Kovacic, Institutional Innovations in Competition Policy in Peru:
INDECOPI After Five Years, 1 INT'L ANTITRUST BULL. 34 (Summer 1998); Gabriel
Castafieda and Fernando Sanchez Ugarte, Mexico Still Setting the Pace for Latin America, I
GLOBAL COMPETITION REv. 12 (Feb./March 1998).
14 See Marijo Ojala, THE COMPETITION LAW OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE (1999);
Michael G. Cowie and Monica Novotna, Premerger Notification in Central and Eastern
Europe, 12 ANTrrRUST 19 (Summer 1998); Carolyn Brzezinski, Competition and Antitrust
Law in Central Europe: Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, 15 MICH. J.
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law system in the last decade, often with the approval, if not at the behest
of, the United States and European Commission. s Even the developing
countries of Southeast Asia16 and the People's Republic of China17 are be-
ginning to adopt laws protecting competition.
There are various reasons for this trend. The increasing adoption of
competition law systems in Eastern Europe, in particular, can be traced to
the pre-accession strategies of countries in that region. In order to apply for
membership in the European Community, a candidate country's legal and
economic systems must exhibit a certain degree of convergence with those
of the Member States of the European Community.1 8 Once an acceptable
degree of convergence is reached, the individual country will enter into a
formal pre-accession agreement with the European Community. Such
agreements typically impose specific obligations on that particular country
to adopt certain economic laws such as laws regulating competition.1 9 In
fact, for a number of years the Competition Directorate of the European
Commission has been working with a number of the candidate countries to
introduce and implement competition law systems.2 0
INT'L L. 1129 (1994); Georghe Oprescu and Eric D. Rohlck, Competition Policy in Transi-
tion Economies: the Case ofRomania, 1999/3 EC COM. PoL'YNEwSL. 62.
15See Karel Van Miert, Competition Policy in relation to the Central and Eastern Euro-
pean Countries -Achievements and Challenges, 1998/2 EC Cow4. POL'Y NEWSL. 1; Robert
Rice, Brittan Urges Basic Competition Rules, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1993, at 3. Kathleen E.
McDermott, U.S. Officials Provide Competition Counseling to Eastern Europe, 5 ANTusT
4 (Fall/Winter 1991); Shanker Singhan, US and European models shaping Latin American
competition law, I GLOBAL CoMp. REv. 15 (Feb./March 1998).
16William E. Kovacic, Capitalism, Socialism, and Competition Policy in Vietnam, 13
ANTITRUST 57 (Summer 1999); William E. Kovacic, Merger Enforcement in Transition:
Antitrust Controls on Acquisitions in Emerging Economies, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 1075 (1998);
William E. Kovacic, Getting Started: Creating New Competition Policy Institutions in Tran-
sition Economies, 23 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 403 (1997); Normin Pakpahan, Indonesia: Enact-
ment of Competition Law, 27 INT'L Bus. LAw. 491 (1999); Whie-kap Cho, Korea's
Economic Crisis. The Role of Competition Policy, 27 INT'L Bus. LAw. 495 (1999); Sutee
Supanit, Thailand: Implementation of Competition Law, 27 INT'L Bus. LAW. 497 (1999).
17Tianlong Yu, An Anti-Unfair Competition Law Without a Core: An Introductory Com-
parison Between US. Antitrust Law and the New Law of the People's Republic of China, 4
IND. INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 315 (1994).
"
8 See Commission, The Enlargement Negotiations after Helsinki, MEMO/00/6 (Feb. 6,
2000). The formal requirements for accession are set forth in art. 49 of the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 145.
'9 For example, the "Europe Agreement" signed with Hungary specifically requires Hun-
gary to adopt competition laws approximating those of the EC, Europe Agreement between
the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of
Hungary, of the other part, 1993 0.. (L 347) 1, art. 68.
2 See, e.g., implementing rules for the application of the competition provisions applica-
ble to undertakings provided for in Article 33, paragraphs I(i), 1(ii) and 2 of the Interim
Agreement between the EC and Poland, 1996 O.J. (L 208) 24; Maria Blissar and Joos
Stragier, Enlargement, 1999/1 EC COMP. POL'Y NEwSL. 58; Karel Van Miert, Competition
Policy in Relation to the Central and Eastern European Countries - Achievements and
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In many other countries, particularly developing countries, the wide-
spread acceptance and adoption of competition law systems can be ex-
plained - at least in part- by the isomorphic behavior of these countries.
Many developing countries, in an attempt to stimulate their economies,
have adopted laws similar to those of the developed countries.21 It is gener-
ally perceived that the adoption of competition laws is necessary to achieve
the economic success witnessed in the developed countries which already
have laws protecting competition.22 Ultimately, the globalization of busi-
ness, combined with the spread of competition laws, increases the potential
for overlap between the laws.
The third factor contributing to the overlap relates to the criteria used
to delineate jurisdiction. The overlap between competition law regimes
caused by globalization does not generally present an issue for the applica-
tion of the laws governing behavioral restraints of competition. In most in-
stances, such laws only apply when there is an actual effect on competition.
There now seems to be a consensus that an effect on competition within a
specific territory may constitute a legitimate nexus upon which to base ju-
risdiction over activities occurring outside of that territory. Instead, this
factor is of relevance only for the overlap between merger control regimes.
A merger control regime refers to the set of laws and procedures which are
part of a competition law system, and which are used by competition regu-
lators to prevent structural restraints of competition resulting from the
change of control over firms. Such change of control transactions are re-
ferred to as concentrations in Europe23 and mergers in the United States.
Merger control laws are generally preventative in nature, i.e. they seek
to prevent a structural restraint of competition prior to its occurrence.2 5 In
order to effectuate this objective, a common component of most merger
control regimes is a premerger notification requirement. Transactions ful-
filling certain criteria must be notified to the regulators prior to their con-
Challenges, 1998/2 EC COMP. POL'Y NEwSL. 1; Tibor Vardady, The Emergence of Compe-
tition Law in (Former) Socialist Countries, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 229, 251 (1999).
21 See Ioannis Kyvelidis, State Isomorphism in the Post-Socialist Tradition, 4 EUROPEAN
INTnGRATION ONLINE PAPIER (2000) available at <http:lleiop.or.atleiop/texte/2000-
002.htm>; Joel Hellman, Constitutions and Economic Reform in the Post-Communist Tran-
sitions, 5 EAST EuR. CONST. REV. 46 (1996).
22Shyam Khemani, Competition policy: an Engine for Growth, I GLOBAL COMP. REV.
20, 23 (Aug./Sept. 1997) ("Competition law policy should be accorded a central place in a
nation's economic policy framework. Such policy has a critical role to play in the restruc-
turing of emerging economies.").
23 See Commission Notice on the Concept of Concentration under Council Regulation
4067/89 on the control of concentrations between undertakings,1998 O.J. (C 66) 5 (EEC).
24See Herbert Hovenkamp, FEDERAL ANTimUST POLICY 442 (1994).
2For a discussion of the objectives of the U.S. merger control regime, see William J.
Baer, Reflections on Twenty Years of Merger Enforcement Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act,
65 ANTnTusTL.J. 825 (1997).
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summation. In many countries, the parties to the transaction are prohibited
from consummating the transaction until a specified waiting period has ex-
pired or approval has been granted. The central challenge facing each
merger control regime is to devise criteria identifying which concentrations
or mergers fall within the scope of the premerger notification requirement.
The application of competition laws prohibiting behavioral restraints of
competition is generally triggered by the occurrence of the event which
constitutes the infringement. This is generally not the case with merger
control regimes. Ideally, concentrations would have to be notified in ad-
vance only in those jurisdictions where, if implemented, the concentration
would infringe the substantive law applicable to the transaction. In the
context of the European Community, for example, this would mean that
only those concentrations which create or strengthen a dominant position in
the Community would have to be notified to the Commission.2 6 In reality,
however, it is difficult to codify workable rules which adequately achieve
this result. A merger control regime which requires premerger review of
only those transactions which, if implemented, would infringe the substan-
tive prohibition is impractical from the perspective of the regulators. Their
position is that such a criterion would allow too many transactions to escape
their scrutiny. Moreover, in most jurisdictions outside the United States,
the authority of the regulators to intervene against a concentration or a
merger is coextensive with the scope of the merger control regime. In
Germany, for example, the Bundeskartellamt cannot intervene against a
concentration as a structural restraint of competition unless the transaction
falls under the premerger notification thresholds set forth in section 39 of
the German Act Against Restraints of Competition.27 Therefore, any re-
duction in the scope of the merger control regime would result in a reduc-
tion in the number of transactions which the regulators could challenge.
The scope of the premerger notification requirement is generally not
limited to transactions which "substantially lessen competition" or "create
or strengthen a dominant position." Instead, most merger control regimes
containing a premerger notification requirement employ surrogate criteria.
This reliance on surrogate criteria to delineate the jurisdictional reach of
merger control regimes exacerbates the overlap between those regimes.
The typical surrogate criterion is the sales volumes of the parties involved
in the transaction. Argentina, Austria, Belgium, the European Community,
26Council Regulation 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the Control of Concentrations
between Undertakings, 1989 O.J. (L 257) 14 (EEC), amended by Council Regulation
1310/97, 1997 O.J. (L 180) 1, art. 2(2) (EC).27Sechstes Gesetz zur .nderung des Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschr~inkungen, Neu-
fassung des Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrdnkungen, v.7.5.1998 (BGBI. 1-2512). In
Germany, a concentration must be notified in advance if the combined world-wide sales of
all the undertakings concerned is DM1 billion and at least one of those undertakings has
sales in Germany of at least DM50 million.
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Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, the Netherlands and Switzerland, for ex-
ample, each rely exclusively on sales volumes to delineate the scope of their
premerger notification requirement. Obviously, the exclusive reliance on
sales volumes generously expands the jurisdictional reach of the merger
control regime. The competition regulators are often required to review
transactions which have no anti-competitive effect in their territory. For
example, the exclusive reliance by the European Community on sales vol-
umes means that the European Commission is forced to expend administra-
tive resources on transactions which, by the Commission's own admission,
have no possible effect on competition in the European Community.28
Other merger control regimes, for example Canada, Ireland, Mexico,
South Korea, and the United States, rely on a combination of assets and
sales volumes to identify which transactions must be notified to the
authorities. For example, the Irish Competition Act requires notification if
at least two parties each have gross assets of IR10 million (approximately
$12 million) or at least two parties each have sales of IR20 million (ap-
proximately $24 million).29 These criteria also expand the scope of the
merger control regime because they are only indirectly related to the anti-
competitive effect which the substantive law is designed to prevent.
Since merger laws are generally concerned with the concentration of
economic power,30 one would think that the premerger notification regimes
would rely on market shares to delineate their scope. In reality, however,
very few premerger control regimes have adopted a market share criterion.
The initial Belgian premerger control regime, for example, required a 25
percent market share in Belgium before a transaction had to be notified.31
However, the law proved difficult to implement and was recently amended.
According to the new law, a concentration must be notified to the Belgian
Competition Council prior to its consummation if the firms involved in the
transaction have combined annual sales in Belgium of EUR40 million or
more and at least two of the firms each have EUR15 million in annual sales.
Some merger control regimes such as those in Greece, Portugal, Spain,
Taiwan and Turkey rely on a combination of sales and market shares to
28See, e.g., Case No IV/M.1224, TPMIWood Group, Commission Decision of July 20,
1998; Case No IV/M.346, JCSAT/SAJAC, Commission Decision of June 30, 1993; Case No
IV/M.1689, Nestl6/Pillsbury/Hagen-Dazs US, Commission Decision of October 6, 1999.29Mergers, Takeovers and Monopolies Control Act (1978), amended by The Competition
Act (1991) and The Competition Amendment Act (1996), (visited March 13, 2000)
<http:/vww.europa.eu.intlcommldgO4/intemalvolume2>.30Ulrich Immenga, International Restrictive Practices and Economic Concentration, in
COMPARATIVE COMPETITION LAW: APPROACHING AN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM OF ANTITRUST
LAv 119, 127 (1998).
3 For an English translation of the initial Belgian law prior to its amendment see Belgian
Protection of Economic Competition Act, 1992 EuR. Comp. L. REv. I (Supplement 1). For
further discussion, see Peter Jacob, Merger Control in Belgium, 20 INT'L Bus. LAW 157
(1992).
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identify which transactions must be notified in advance. In Portugal, for
example, a concentration must be notified if it creates or strengthens a mar-
ket share of 30 percent.32 However, none of these jurisdictions relies exclu-
sively on market share. In other words, the market share threshold is
merely an alternative which triggers the premerger notification requirement.
Premerger notification may be required in these countries if certain sales
volume thresholds are met or exceeded even if the parties to the transaction
have insignificant market shares.
33
Many countries have recognized that the reliance on surrogate criteria
has expanded the scope of premerger control regimes to transactions which
present no threat to competition within their territory. There are several
ways in which countries have responded. The United States has adopted
exemptions from the premerger notification requirements for "transactions" c e ,,14
having only a limited nexus with United States commerce. For example,
all acquisitions of foreign assets by a foreign person are exempt from the pre-
merger notification requirement regardless of the amount of sales into the
United States attributable to those assets.35 Acquisitions of United States as-
sets by foreign persons may also be exempt if the value of the assets (exclud-
ing investment assets) acquired is less than $15 million.36 The exemptions
arise from the recognition that the "principal impact" of such transactions
will in most cases be outside of the United States, and "it is [therefore] ap-
propriate for the agency in its discretion to exercise a self-imposed limita-
tion and decline to subject them to the act's requirements.""
Other countries such as Austria have amended their thresholds in an
attempt to limit the notification requirement to those transactions which
have an effect on competition in their respective countries. Prior to this
32Decree Law No. 371/93 of Oct. 29, 1993 on the Protection of Competition, art. 7(l)
(English translation at <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/dg04/intema/volume2> (visited
March 13, 2000)). For further discussion, see Luis Miguel Antunes, Competition Law in
Portugal, 1995 ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 189, 192 (1996).33 In Greece, for example, a notification is required if the combined sales in Greece ex-
ceed ECU50 million and at least two of the parties each has sales in Greece exceeding ECU5
million. In Portugal, annual sales of ESC30 billion (approximately $146 million) are all that
is needed to trigger the premerger filing requirement regardless of the market shares of the
entities involved. In Spain, combined annual sales in Spain exceed PTA40 billion (approxi-
mately $234 million) and at least two of the parties had sales in Spain of at least PTAIO bil-
lion (approximately $59 million).34 Statement of Basis and Purpose, 43 Fed. Reg. 33451, 33495 (1978).
3516 C.F.R. §802.51(a)(1999).16 16 C.F.R. §802.51(c)(1999).
37Statement of Basis and Purpose, 43 Fed. Reg. 33451, 33495 (1978). Argentina re-
cently adopted a similar (albeit narrower) exception to its premerger notification regime.
The acquisition of an Argentinean company by a foreign company is not subject to the noti-
fication requirement if the foreign company did not previously own assets in Argentina or
shares in an Argentinean company. See Rafael Dargo, Juan Arocena & Dante Ramos, Ar-
gentina's New Antitrust Law, 2(3) INT'L ANTITRUST BULL. 24, 25 (Winter 1999).
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year, the Austrian premerger control regime required notification of a con-
centration if the annual combined sales of the parties involved in the con-
centration was at least AS3.5 billion (approximately $270 million) and the
annual sales of at least two of the undertakings concerned was at least AS5
million (approximately $385,000).38 Using these thresholds, an acquisition
by Sony of Japan of a South African grocery store would have technically
had to be notified to the Austrian Kartellgericht even though the transaction
would have no effect in Austria. In 1999, however, the Austrian legislature
revised the thresholds in an attempt to narrow the notification requirement
only to those concentrations which have a potential effect in Austria.39 Un-
der the current law, premerger notification is required only if the aggregate
world-wide sales of all "undertakings concerned" is at least AS4.2 billion
(approximately $306 million), the aggregate Austrian sales of all undertak-
ings concerned is at least AS210 million (approximately $13 million) and at
least two of the undertakings concerned have world-wide sales of at least
AS28 million (approximately $2 million).40 Nonetheless, under the current
law, the acquisition by America Online of a local trucking company in Chi-
cago with sales of over $2 million would, for example, still fall under the
Austrian merger control regime even though there is no chance of an anti-
competitive effect in Austria.41
These examples merely illustrate that the reliance on "surrogate" crite-
ria to delineate the scope of merger control regimes creates the potential for
overlap between such regimes. As businesses increase their sales beyond
their national borders, and as more countries adopt merger control regimes,
the potential for overlap increases. The public and private costs associated
with this overlap call for a solution.
B. Costs of Overlapping Merger Control Jurisdiction
Overlapping merger control jurisdiction results in significant public
and private costs. First, the application of multiple merger control regimes
to the same transaction imposes substantial compliance costs on the firms
involved in the transaction. In each transaction, the firms must expend re-
sources to determine whether a filing is required in each of the jurisdictions
38Bundesgesetz vom 19. Oktober 1988 Ober Kartelle und andere Wettbew-
erbsbeschrdnkungen, v.19.10.1988 (BGBI. Nr. 600) as amended in 1993, at §42a.39Kartellgesetznovelle 1999, (BGBI. I Nr. 126).40Bundesgesetz vom 19. Oktober 1988 fOber Kartelle und andere Wettbew-
erbsbeschrankungen, v.19.10.1988 (BGB1. Nr. 600) as amended in 1999, at §42a(1).
41The Austrian premerger notification thresholds have been criticized in Austria because
of its potential to include such transactions. See Viktor Thumher, Kartellrecht 2000 - Der
osterreichische Weg, 49 WmrTscHAFT UND WErmmWvERB 1080, 1084 (1999); Johannes Bar-
bist/Girsch, Die Kartellgesetznovelle 1999 als Regierungsvorlage, 10 ECOLEX 410 (1999);
Johannes Barbist & Ivo Rungg, Neues in der 6sterreichischen Fusionskontrolle nach der
KatGNov. 1999, 11 ECOLEX 51, 52 (2000).
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where they (or, in the case of the acquiring party, the group to which the
acquiring entity belongs) has assets or sales. This, in itself, is a time-
consuming and costly process.42 For example, one observer, based on vari-
ous interviews with practitioners, estimates the legal fees associated with
obtaining clearance under the European Merger Control Regulation to be
between ECU76,000 and ECU152,000. 43 Once the individual countries
where premerger notification is required or advisable are identified, the in-
dividual filings must be prepared. Since each country has its own notifica-
tion forms and requirements, this is an equally cumbersome and costly
process.44
Second, the increase in overlap between merger control regimes im-
poses costs on the regulators. In the face of shrinking budgets, regulatory
efficiency has become an important goal in many jurisdictions. The ad-
ministrative and financial resources being made available to the competition
regulators are strained as regulators attempt to respond to the challenge pre-
sented by globalization.45 For example, the European Commissioner for
42For a discussion of the procedures firms generally follow in making this determination,
see Adam Frederickson, A Strategic Approach to Multi-jurisdictional Filings, 4 EUR.
COUNSEL 23 (Dec. 1999/Jan. 2000). In many instances, the answer to this question may not
be clear. Many pre-merger control regimes are new and the regulators have little experience
in applying them. In the case of Mexico, for example, during the first years after the Mexi-
can merger control regime was adopted, the lack of guidance notices and case law made de-
termination of the necessity of a pre-merger notification very difficult. If a firm sought
guidance from the Mexican Federal Competition Commission, the response was typically
that the parties should notify. For a discussion of the Mexican experience see Michael Wise,
Review of Competition Law and Policy in Mexico, I OECD J. COMP. L. & POL'Y 44, 82
(Dec. 1999); Allan Van Fleet, Mexico's Competition Policy: Lessons for Developing
Economies, 1 GLOBAL COMP. REv. 23 (April/May 1998).43 Morten Broberg, THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S JURISDICTION TO SCRUTINIZE MERGERS
227 (1998). The private costs associated with overlapping re-merger control jurisdiction are
discussed in the Final Report of the International Competition Policy Advisory Committee to
the Attorney General and Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust 90-94 (2000).
"Although France, Germany and the UK have adopted a common pre-merger notifica-
tion form, available at <http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/anmeldeformular-in-gb.html>, it
does not replace any formal notification in France or in the United Kingdom. Consequently,
it is not being used by practitioners. In addition, the OECD's Committee on Competition
Law and Policy has proposed a common form to alleviate the burdens associated with multi-
ple filings using different notification forms, OECD, Report on Notification of Transnational
Mergers, DAFFE/CLP(99)2/FINAL (Feb. 23, 1999). However, this proposed common form
has not been integrated into any merger control regime.
45See, e.g., John Nannes, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Divisions, U.S.
Dept. of Justice, Last Year and This Year: The View from the Antitrust Trenches, Address to
the Antitrust Law Section of the New York State Bar Association Annual Meeting (Jan. 27,
2000) ("We spend a good deal of time worrying about resource allocation. The Antitrust
Division has just weathered a difficult attack on its budget. Nevertheless, we remain severely
constrained. We currently employ 361 attorneys which, by way of contrast, is significantly
less than the 456 attorneys employed by the Antitrust Division 20 years ago. The Antitrust
Division's budget for FY 2000 is $110 million. That is an increase over FY 1999 expendi-
tures but, after annual non-discretionary cost increases and anticipated litigation costs are
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Competition Policy, Mr. Mario Monti, recently stated that the European
Commission would strive to achieve more efficient enforcement by focus-
ing on "the essentials," i.e., "cases which have a real Community interest
and which raise serious competition issues." 46 The situation in the U.S. is
no different. Robert Pitofsky, Chairman of the U.S. Federal Trade Com-
mission, recently concluded in his testimony before the U.S. Senate Sub-
committee on Antitrust, Business Rights, and Competition that "the merger
wave strains the FTC resources to the breaking point.
''7
The reliance on surrogate criteria in merger control regimes such as
sales volumes requires the regulators to review many concentrations which
present no real competition issues. One recent survey has shown that at
least 95 percent of merger transactions which are reportable transactions
under a merger control regime do not infringe the substantive prohibition.4
Although it is difficult to estimate precisely, it is safe to conjecture that a
good portion of these transactions have no effect in some of the jurisdic-
tions in which they are notified. The annual costs of reviewing premerger
notifications for transactions which have no effect in the United States have
been estimated at over $1 billion.49 The review of such cases is a waste of
scarce administrative resources particularly if the same transaction is being
reviewed by other competition regulators. For example, when Nestl6 USA
and The Pillsbury Company decided to contribute certain assets located in
taken into account, that increase will permit us to add only two new attorneys and 16 new
paralegals to handle a workload that is increasing on every front."). Id.46Mario Monti, Speech given at the formal introduction ceremony of the new President
of the Bundeskartellamt (Jan. 13, 2000), SPEECH/00/6, at 3. See also Mario Monti, Mod-
emisation of E.U. Competition Rules, SPEECH/00164 (Mar. 2, 2000); MICHELLE CINI & LEE
MCGOVAN, COMPETITION POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 223 (1998)("[Ilt seems clear that
the Commission will face numerous challenges as it seeks to improve its competition en-
forcement into the twenty-first century... On the one hand, there are the challenges of ef-
fectiveness. This questions DGIV's capacity to cope with the enormous case responsibilities
while remaining focused on policy outcomes. The main issue is, as ever, that of re-
sources."); Michael Wise, supra note 42, at 44 ("The budget stringency may be impeding
work, to some extent, as the total budget per employee for 1997 was only about half what it
was in 1994.")47Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission to the U.S. Senate Subcommittee
on Antitrust, Business Rights, and Competition, Mar. 22, 2000, at 3. See also Statement of
Joel Klein before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust, Business Rights, and Compe-
tition, Mar.22, 2000; John Nannes, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Divisions,
U.S. Dept. of Justice, Last Year and This Year: The View from the Antitrust Trenches, Ad-
dress before the Antitrust Law Section of the New York State Bar Association Annual
Meeting (Jan. 27, 2000) at 5.
"J. William Rowley & A. Neil Campbell, Multi-Jurisdictional Merger Review - Is It
Time for a Common Form Filing Treaty?, POL'Y DIRECTIONS FOR GLOBAL MERGER REv. 9,
17 (1999).49j. Simms & D. Herman, The Effect of Twenty Years of Hart-Scolt-Rodino on Merger
Practice: A Case Study in the Law of Unintended Consequences Applied to Antitrust Legis-
lation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 865 (1997).
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the United States to a joint venture in the United States, the parties were
forced to notify the transaction to the European Commission as well as the
U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission.5 The Euro-
pean Commission was consequently forced to give a decision in the case in
which it admitted "that the notified operation will have no impact on com-
petition in the EEA.
' 51
Finally, overlapping merger control jurisdiction imposes political costs
in the form of jurisdictional conflicts. As the high-profile McDonnell
Douglas/Boeing case aptly illustrates, the political value of premerger ap-
proval decisions combined with the inability to precisely and objectively
define an unacceptable structural restraint of competition makes the appli-
cation of merger control rules vulnerable to political interference. In many
instances, the application of merger control rules may appear to be influ-
enced by political or industrial policy objectives.5 2 In such cases, the appli-
cation of multiple merger control regimes to the same transaction may lead
to political conflict between the politicians in the country which approves
the transaction and the politicians in another country which prohibit the
same transaction.
Im. THE FAILURE OF PREVIOUS PROPOSALS TO ESTABLISHING AN
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION LAW REGIME
There has been no shortage of attempts to create an international com-
petition law regime. 3 None of the proposals have been implemented and
their prospects look rather bleak.5 4 Although international enforcement co-
501999 O.J. (C 260) 2.
51 Case No IV/M.1689, Nestl6/Pillsbury/Hagen-Dazs US, Commission Decision of Oc-
tober 6, 1999, at 8.52See, e.g., Catherine Yang, When Protectionism Wears Camouflage, Bus. WK., June 2,
1997, at 60. See also Edmund Andrews, European Regulators Frown on a Combined MCI-
Sprint, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2000 at C4 (Speculating that one possible reason for additional
European concern is that European companies cannot keep pace with the U.S.).
53See, e.g., Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, arts. 46-54, U.N.
Doc. E/Conf. 2/78 (1948), reprinted in U.S. Dep't of State, Pub. No. 3206, at 86-91 (1948);
OECD, Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises of June 21,
1976, reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 967 (1976); UNCTAD, The Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equi-
table Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices, UN Doc.
TD/RBP/CONF/10, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 813 (1980); International Antitrust Code Working
Group, Draft International code as a GATT-MTO Plurilateral Trade Agreement, July 10,
1993, reprinted in 65 ANTrrRUST & TRADEREG. REP. (BNA) No. 1628, S-1 (Aug. 19, 1993).
-See, e.g., Interview with Ulf Bge, President of the German Cartel Office, Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung E.AZ., Dec. 27, 1999, at 14; Antitrust Division Official Predicts Scant
Prospect of International Code, I1 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 220 (Feb. 9, 1994); OECD
Committee Lacks Enthusiasm for Draft International Antitrust Code, 10 INT'L TRADE REP.
(BNA) 2096 (1995).
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ordination seems to be working,55 the general consensus is that an interna-
tional competition law regime, or even substantive harmonization, is not on
the horizon.56 The primary difficulty remain convincing the politicians that
such steps are in the national interest. Given the divergent interests of na-
tions, this is an extremely difficult task.5 7 Earlier attempts to create an in-
ternational competition law regime have, for example, failed because the
United States refused to throw its weight behind such efforts. Although the
Europeans have recently promoted an international competition law regime
in an attempt to address the political conflict resulting from overlapping na-
tional jurisdictions, 58 the United States remains unconvinced that such a re-
gime is necessary or desirable.59
Secondly, the politicians and regulators would have to be persuaded
that such steps were in their personal interests. Politicians and regulators
55See generally Spencer Weber Waller, The Internationalization of Antitrust Enforce-
ment, 77 B.U. L. REv. 343 (1997).
56 G6tz Drauz & Thalia Lingos, The Treatment of Trans-Border mergers in the 1990's: A
European Perspective, POL'Y DIRCTIONS FOR GLOBAL MERGER REV. 55, 58 (1999); Joel I.
Klein, A Note of Caution with Respect to a WTO Agenda on Competition Policy, Transcript
of speech at The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, Nov. 18, 1996; A Douglas
Melamed, Antitrust Enforcement in a Global Economy, 1998 ANNuAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE
FORDHAm CORP. L. INsT. 1 (1999); William J. Baer, International Antitrust Policy, 1998
ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORDHAM CORP. L. INsT. 247 (1999); Interview with Ulf
B6ge, President of the German Cartel Office, Frankfurter AlIgemeine Zeitung, Dec. 27,
1999, p. 1; Leserbrief von Dieter Wolf - Prasident des Bundeskartellamtes, available at
<http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/fazbrief.html>. Alexander Schaub, International co-
operation in antitrust matters: making the point in the wake of the Boeing/MDD proceed-
ings, 1998/1 EC COMP. POL'Y NEwSL. 2, 4 ("A multilateral (for instance within the WTO) or
bilateral arbitration mechanism (and to a greater degree a global antitrust authority), which
would allow us to resolve case related conflicts and go beyond limitations imposed by the
necessity for each competition authority to implement its own legal rules and to take primar-
ily account of the specific market conditions and the consumer interests in the territory it po-
lices, is inconceivable under the current circumstances.").
5For a discussion of the difficulties on achieving a political consensus in the face of di-
vergent national interests, see Andrew T. Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, 73
N.Y.U.L. REv. 1501 (1998).
58Karel Van Miert, The WTO and Competition Policy: The Need to Consider Negotia-
tions, ADDRESS BEFORE AMBASSADORS TO THE WTO (April 21, 1998); Sir Leon Brittan and
Karel Van Miert, Towards an International Framework of Competition Rules, 24 INT'L Bus.
LAW. 454 (1996).
59See generally Debra Valentine, Building a Cooperative Framework for OVersight in
Mergers - The Answer to Extraterritorial Issues in Merger Review, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV.
525, 529 (1998); Klein, supra note 56; Joel I. Klein, Anticipating the Millenium: Interna-
tional Antitrust Enforcement at the End of the Twentieth Century, (transcript available at the
Fordham Corporate Law Institute); Report of The President's Advisory Committee for Trade
Policy and Negotiations, reported at 13 INT'L TRADE REP. 1476 (Sept. 25, 1996); Diane P.
Wood, The Impossible Dream: Real InternationalAntitrust, 1992 U. CI. LEGAL F. 277; Di-
ane P. Wood, The Internationalization ofAntitrust Law: Options for the Future, 44 DEPAUL
L. REv. 1289, 1294-1298 (1995); Caution Necessary Concerning WTO Agenda on Competi-
tion Rules Justice Officials Warns, 13(47) INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1856 (1996).
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are generally reluctant to relinquish sovereignty over competition decisions,
and in particular merger approval decisions, to an independent suprana-
tional body. Decisions in large merger cases have significant political
value. They can be used to impose costs on companies from outside a poli-
tician's jurisdiction or prevent unemployment associated with the
downsizing which almost invariably follows a merger.60 Even if the politi-
cal use of merger control laws is not beneficial to the interests of the share-
holders of the company, in most instances, the shareholders are not the
constituents. Therefore, the ability to block a merger or at least seek con-
cessions from the company carries significant political value for national
and local politicians. The political value of merger approval decisions was
clearly apparent in the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas case.61
Any proposals to create an international competition law regime must
take these political realities into account. In the past, the inability to
achieve the requisite political consensus on establishing an international
competition law regime was due partly to the fact that the proposals were
over-ambitious. Each would have necessitated the relinquishment of a cer-
tain degree of sovereignty over cases with political value. The attractive-
ness of a competition law regime from the perspective of the politicians can
be enhanced if the necessary relinquishment of sovereignty is limited, at
least initially, to cases with low political value.
All merger cases, even those with no anti-competitive effect, carry
some political value. If, for example, two companies in the U.S. planned to
merge and thereby realize certain efficiencies which would give the merged
entity a competitive advantage over a competitor in Japan who imports into
the U.S., the ability to block the transaction would be of value to the Japa-
nese politician in whose district the Japanese competitor was based. The
value to the Japanese politician would exist regardless of whether the trans-
action had an anti-competitive effect in Japan. However, the political use of
merger decisions in such cases is much more difficult to disguise as the le-
gitimate application of the merger control laws. It would be extremely dif-
ficult to block a merger unless there is some appreciable anti-competitive
effect in the country concerned. Therefore, the national politicians are
much more willing to relinquish control over such transactions.
6OSee Malchom B. Coate, et al., Bureaucracy and Politics in FTC Merger Challenges, in
THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ANTITRUST 213, 229 (F. McChesney and W. Shugart,
eds. 1995) ("Merger challenges, like antitakeover legislation, prevent the exit of resources
and votes from a politician's jurisdiction and, thus, allow the politician to respond to organ-
ized labor and management interests that seek to prevent the changes caused by mergers.");
William F. Shugart and Robert D. Tollison, The Employment Consequences of the Sherman
and Clayton Acts, 147 J. INSTrrTUONAL AND THEORBTICAL ECONOMICS 38 (March 1991).61Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust Regulation Across National Borders: The United States of
Boeing versus the European Union ofAirbus, 16(1) BROOKINGS REV. 30 (1998).
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IV. THE CREATION OF THE WTO PREMERGER CONTROL REGIME
A. Fundamental Objective of the WTO Premerger Control Regime
The political and economic costs resulting from increasing overlap
between premerger control regimes suggest that there may be a role for a
supranational premerger control regime. The proposal here is to create a
premerger control office in the framework of the WTO (the "WTO
Premerger Office") with the authority to review certain international con-
centrations. However, the political realities which have undermined earlier
efforts at an international competition law regime limit the authority which
such an office can be granted. The purpose of creating a WTO Premerger
Office would not be to usurp the sovereignty of the national regulators over
concentrations or mergers. In fact, the authority of the WTO Premerger Of-
fice could not extend to a substantive review of the transaction. Moreover,
it would have to be limited to a review of the cases with insignificant politi-
cal value. The objective of the WTO Premerger Office would be to assist
business and regulators by identifying those transactions which present no
threat to competition.
The institution proposed here could technically operate independently
or in the context of another international institution. However, the WTO is
probably the most appropriate framework in which to implement an inter-
national merger control regime. Not only is the WTO already equipped
with the institutional structure which could readily absorb the Premerger
Office, 62 it is generally perceived as an objective decision-making institu-
tion staffed with professionals and it represents a greater array of interests
than other organizations such as the OECD. That mantle of legitimacy
would serve to make the WTO Premerger Office more effective. Moreover,
the WTO Premerger Office may serve as a precursor to future efforts to
create an international competition law regime integrated into the world
trading system.63 Accordingly, the WTO is generally accepted" as providing
62The WTO Agreement, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994), is an "umbrella" agreement which es-
tablishes the general institutional framework for the specific agreements such as Multilateral
Agreement on Trade in Goods, 33 I.L.M. 1154 (1994), General Agreement on Trade in
Services, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994), Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994).
63 It is generally accepted that the creation of international competition rules would have
to be integrated with the rules governing trade. See generally Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, In-
ternational Competition Rules for the GATT-MTO World Trade and Legal System, 27(6) J.
WoRLD TRADE 35 (1993); Harvey M. Applebaum, The Coexistence of Antitrust Law and
Trade Law with Antitrust Policy, 9 CARDOZO L. REv. 1169 (1988); Report of the Group of
Experts, Competition Policy in the New Trade Order: Strengthening International Coopera-
tion and Rules, COM (95) 359 final.
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the appropriate framework in which to achieve an international competition
law regime.64
B. The Essential Components of the WTO Premerger Control Regime
The creation of the WTO Premerger Office and implementation of the
WTO premerger control regime would be based on several essential com-
ponents. The first component would be to identify its tasks. The funda-
mental task of the WTO Premerger Office would be, for a particular
transaction, to identify the jurisdictions in which the transaction would have
no effect on competition although a premerger notification is required. In
other words, the WTO Premerger Office would act as a "filter" for com-
petitively insignificant concentrations which otherwise would have to be
notified in several jurisdictions. It is important to note that it would not be
the task of the WTO Premerger Office to opine on the permissibility of a
concentration under the applicable substantive laws or even determine
whether a transaction was notifiable in a particular jurisdiction. As dis-
cussed above, the reliance on surrogate criteria to delineate the scope of the
merger control regimes results in the notification of transactions which pre-
sent no threat to competition. In practice, there are a significant number of
cases which any reasonable observer could identify as being irrelevant from
a competition law perspective. It would be the task of the WTO Premerger
Office to filter these out and thereby avoid the public and private costs as-
sociated with filings which are unnecessary from a substantive competition
law perspective. The goal is not to prevent one state from reviewing a
merger which raises anticompetitive concerns or to allocate cases between
jurisdictions,65 but rather relieve the parties and the regulators from the bur-
den of reviewing inconsequential transactions.
64See generally Report of the Group Experts, supra note 63. Address of Hisamitsu Arai,
Global Competition Policy as a Basis for a Borderless Market Economy (July 22, 1999)
available at <http://www.miti.go.jp/topic-e/eWTO0997e.html>, Philip Marsden, "Antitrust"
at the WTO, 13(l) ANTITRUST 28 (1998); Karel Van Miert, The WTO and Competition
Policy: The Need to Consider Negotiations, Address before Ambassadors to the WTO (April
21, 1998) (transcript available at <http://www.insidetrade.com/sec-
cgi/asweb.exe?SECworld36+D+29147467>; Mitsuo Matsushita, Competition Law and
Policy in the Context of the WTO System, 44 DEPAuL L. REV. 1097 (1995); Emst-Ulrich Pe-
tersmann, Proposals for Negotiating International Competition Rules in the GAYT-WTO
World Trade and Legal System, 49 AuSsENwiRTscaAFT 231 (1994); Mitsuo Matsushita, Re-
flections on Competition Policy/Law in the Framework of the WTO, 1998 FORDHAM CORP.
L. INsT. 31 (B. Hawk, ed. 1998); Friedl Weiss, From World Trade Law to World Competi-
tion Law, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. S250 (2000); Phedon Nicolaides, For a World Competi-
tion Authority, 30(4) J. WORLD TRADE L. 131 (1996); Sir Leon Brittan and Karel Van Miert,
Towards an International Framework of Competition Rules, 24 INT'L Bus. LAW. 454 (1996).
65Although competition regulators generally recognize a transaction usually has a "natu-
ral centre of gravity" upon which to base the allocation of jurisdiction, see G6tz Drauz &
Thalia Lingos, The Treatment of Trans-Border mergers in the 1990's: A European Perspec-
tive, POL'Y DIRECTIONS FOR GLOBAL MERGER Rv. 55, 58 (1999), it would be difficult to
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The success of this proposal is based on the notion that it is much eas-
ier to identify those transactions which present no threat to competition in a
particular geographic area than to identify those transactions which should
be prohibited because of their potential effect on competition. In fact, this
"filtering" task is already being done informally by national regulators. The
European Community, for example, relies extensively on the concept of
"affected market" to filter out the cases which present no threat to competi-
tion.66 In the U.S., the Federal Trade Commission relies on the Premerger
Notification Office ("PNO") to initially assess whether a particular transac-
tion should be reviewed in greater detail. In most cases, the civil servants at
the PNO can readily identify those transactions which are of no interest to
the competition regulators. Although it is difficult to formalize, many other
jurisdictions rely on some sort of filter to identify which transactions justify
their serious attention. Such task should be shifted to the WTO Premerger
Office for concentrations which would otherwise have to be notified in sev-
eral jurisdictions.
The second essential component of the WTO premerger control regime
would be rules governing its jurisdiction. The WTO Premerger Office
would have jurisdiction over those transactions which are notifiable in more
than one jurisdiction and which are voluntarily notified to it by the parties.
As indicated above, the responsibility for identifying the jurisdictions in
which a particular transaction is notifiable would remain with the parties.
Once the jurisdictions were identified by the parties, they would have the
option of submitting filings in each of those jurisdictions, or submitting one
filing to the WTO Premerger Office. In the notification to the WTO
Premerger Office, the parties would have to specify (and substantiate their
specifications) the jurisdictions in which the transaction would be notifi-
able. The decision of the WTO Premerger Office would only cover those
specified jurisdictions. However, the parties would have to notify the trans-
action to the WTO Premerger Office before notifying a national agency.
Otherwise, the disposition of the national authorities would influence the
decision of the parties to the WTO Premerger Office.
The third essential component would be an agreement by the partici-
pating countries to abide by the decision reached by the WTO Premerger
Office. This could be achieved by the codification of an exemption in each
convince national politicians to grant such authority to an independent, supranational institu-
tion.
6See Form CO Relating to the Notification of a Concentration Pursuant to Regulation
4064/89, 1998 O.J. (L 61) 11, 19 (EEC). An affected market is a relevant market in the
Community in which two or more of the parties to the concentration are engaged in business
activities and where the concentration would lead to a combined market share of 15 percent
or more, or a market in the Community in which one or more of the parties to the concentra-
tion are engaged in business activities, which is upstream or downstream of a product market
in which any other party to the concentration is engaged, and any of their individual or com-
bined market shares is 25 percent or more.
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national merger control regime for transactions which the WTO Premerger
Office determined had no effect in its area. For example, many of the
European national merger control regimes already have such provisions in
favor of the European Merger Control Regulation.67 Although the initial
notification by the parties to the WTO Premerger Office would be volun-
tary, the system would soon prove to be ineffectual unless the national
competition regulators were prevented from reviewing a transaction which
had been reviewed by the WTO Premerger Office. The danger of forum
shopping would be minimized because the WTO Premerger Office would
only have the authority to determine the jurisdictions in which there is no
effect. Assuming that there is no competitive effect in a particular jurisdic-
tion, the parties would have no incentive to forum shop and avoid that ju-
risdiction in the first place.
The requirement that the participating states relinquish a certain degree
of sovereignty would not necessarily condemn this proposal to the same
destiny as past attempts to establish an international competition law re-
gime. There would be relatively little political value in the cases over
which the WTO Premerger Office had jurisdiction. As indicated above, the
sole task of the WTO Premerger Office would be to identify those jurisdic-
tions in which there is no anti-competitive effect. The lack of an anti-
competitive effect will generally mean that the public and private cost sav-
ings will exceed the value of the decision-making authority to the politi-
cians. Accordingly, the chances of achieving a political consensus to create
an international premerger control regime are greater.
Another essential component of the WTO premerger control regime
would be the inclusion of an exemption for cases in which a participating
state can substantiate that, for certain legitimate reasons, it should be al-
lowed to review a transaction that had been notified to the WTO Premerger
Office. This exemption would be essential to achieve the political consen-
sus required to insure the success of the proposal.6' The specific standard
used in the exemption could be similar to the "important interests" standard
67See, e.g., Finnish Act on Competition Restrictions 480/1992, art. l1a(2)(3); Dutch
Competition Act of May 22, 1997, art. 33(1), English translation, 18(6) EuR. CoMp. L. REv.
395 (Supplement September 1997); Spanish Competition Law 16/1989 as amended by Law
6/1999, art. 14(1), English translation, 20(6) EuR. Comp. L. REv. 1 (Supplement August
1999).68For example, the exemption provided for in Article 9 of the Mergers, Takeovers and
Monopolies Control Act, see supra note 29, which, under certain circumstances, allows the
national authorities to review a transaction which otherwise was within the exclusive juris-
diction of the European Commission because necessary to gamer the support of the German
government in the adoption of the Regulation. For further discussion, see Simon Hirsbrun-
ner, Referral of Mergers in E.C. Merger Control, 20(7) EuR. CoMp. L. REv. 372 (1999).
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used in the antitrust enforcement cooperation agreements between the US
and the EU.
69
The real challenge is identifying in a particular case which interests are
legitimate. Clearly one interest would have to be the potential anti-
competitive effect of the transaction in that state contrary to the conclusions
of the WTO Premerger Office. In other words, the participating state could
overrule the decision of the WTO Premerger Office. In addition, non-
competition policy concerns such as industrial, environmental and employ-
ment policies would have to be recognized. If, for example, the WTO
Premerger Office decided that a transaction did not have a potential effect
in a particular country, and yet that country considered the transaction to
have important environmental policy implications, that country could still
apply its own merger control regime to the transaction.
It might appear at first that the exception creates the potential for abuse
by the participating states. In reality, however, there are two factors which
indicate that it is unlikely that the exception would be abused. First, the
participating state would have to demonstrate that its legitimate interests are
at stake. Second, the participating states would have no substantial incen-
tive to rely on the exception. Since the WTO Premerger Control Office
would have jurisdiction only over insignificant concentrations, most states
would not be interested in such transactions. Moreover, if the WTO
Premerger Control Office concluded that a transaction would have no effect
in a particular jurisdiction, it would be difficult for regulators in that juris-
diction to prohibit the transaction.
Nonetheless, the WTO premerger control regime could adopt some
mechanism to prevent the abuse of the exemption. One way to limit the il-
legitimate use of the exemption would be to preclude reliance upon it by
those countries in which neither of the parties has a market share above a
certain level; 10 percent for example. It is highly unlikely that a country
will have a legitimate interest in prohibiting a transaction in which neither
of the parties has a market share over 10 percent.
In order to make its decision, the WTO Premerger Office would have
to collect a certain amount of information to allow it to assess the structure
of the relevant markets. Several authors have already identified the compo-
nents of a common form which could be utilized to collect the necessary in-
formation.70 In fact, last year the Organization for Economic Cooperation
69See Agreement of September 23, 1991 between the Government of the United States of
America and the Commission of the European Community regarding the application of their
competition laws,1995 O.J. (L 95) 47; 30 I.L.M. 1491 (1991); Agreement of June 4, 1998
between the Government of the United States of America and the Commission of the Euro-
pean Community regarding the application of positive comity principles in the enforcement
of their competition laws,1998 O.J. (L 173) 28.70 j. William Rowley & A. Neil Campbell, Multi-Jurisdictional Merger Review - Is It
Time for a Common Form Filing Treaty?, POL'Y DIRECrIONS FOR GLOBAL MERGER REv. 9
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and Development published a "Framework for a Notification and Report
Form for Concentrations" which could be used in a modified form by the
WTO Premerger Office. In the event that the WTO Premerger Office
concluded that the transaction would have an effect in certain jurisdictions,
the information collected and compiled in the WTO notification could be
used at the national level. In other words, the participating states would
have to adopt the standardized form for transactions which are reportable in
more than one jurisdiction.
C. Disadvantages of a WTO Merger Control Regime
Critics of a WTO merger control regime may argue that a regime
which merely identifies the jurisdictions in which a transaction would have
no effect will serve to add another layer of regulation to those transactions
which are notified to it and actually do have an effect. It is correct that such
transactions would then have to be notified to and reviewed by the respec-
tive national regulators. The consummation of the transaction would then
be further delayed because the parties would have to respect the applicable
waiting periods. It is important to note, however, that the merger control
regime proposed here would be voluntary. It would be the unilateral deci-
sion of the parties to notify their transaction to the WTO Premerger Office.
If the costs associated with the potential for additional delay exceed the
costs of notifying the transaction in jurisdictions in which it has no effect,
then the parties would be advised to forego the WTO Premerger Office and
notify their transaction directly to the national regulators.
Another potential shortcoming of this proposal concerns the difficulty
in defining the standard used by the WTO Premerger Office in reviewing
transactions. As indicated above, the basic task of the WTO Premerger Of-
fice would be to identify those jurisdictions in which the proposed transac-
tion would not have an anti-competitive effect. One could argue, however,
that the national merger control regimes employ different substantive stan-
dards of review. The existing merger control regimes may be divided into
three categories based on their substantive standard of review: (1) regimes
which prohibit the creation or strengthening of a dominant position, (2) re-
gimes which prohibit the substantial lessening of competition and (3) re-
gimes which consider both the effect on competition and other policy
(1999); D. Berry, Common Merger Application Form, GLOBAL COMP. REv. 50 (Dec.
1997/Jan. 1998). W. J. Kolasky & I. W. Lowe, The Merger Review Process at the Federal
Trade Commission: Administrative Efficiency and the Rule of Law, 49 ADMIN. L. REv. 889
(1997); DiANE WOOD & RICHARD WHISH, MERGER CASES IN THE REAL WORLD: A STUDY OF
MERGER CONTROL PROCEDURES (1994).7 1 OECD, Report on Notification of Transnational Mergers, DAFFE/CLP(99)2/FINAL
(Feb. 23, 1999) on file at <http://www.oecd.org/daf/clp/CLPreports/notifimergers.pdf>.
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concerns. 72 In each case, however, there must be an effect on competition
within the jurisdiction. In some instances, this effect is imposed by the ap-
plicable law itself.73 However, even if the national law does not expressly
codify this requirement, the generally accepted basis of jurisdiction under
international law in competition law cases requires an effect within that ter-
ritory. Therefore, the WTO Premerger Office would be determining the
existence of something which each premerger control regime requires at a
minimum.
V. CONCLUSION
Globalization and the widespread acceptance of the benefits of laws
regulating competition have resulted in substantial overlap between national
competition law regimes. This overlap is particularly apparent in the con-
text of merger control. Because merger control regimes rely on sales vol-
umes and other criteria only indirectly related to the harm which they are
designed to prevent, they often apply to transactions which have no nega-
tive effect on competition in the relevant territory. It is not uncommon that
parties to a transaction which presents no anti-competitive effect must
nonetheless incur the costs of notifying that transaction in a number of ju-
risdictions. In most instances, such cases are filtered out by the national
regulators at an early stage. Nonetheless, a significant amount of public
and private resources must be expended along the way. An international in-
stitution with the function of identifying the jurisdictions in which a par-
ticular transaction will have no anti-competitive effect would result in
public and private savings and allow the regulators to focus their resources
on more difficult cases. This proposal is based, in part, on the realization
that it is much easier to identify which merger will not be of legitimate con-
cern to national regulators than to identify which mergers will be of legiti-
mate concern for national regulators. Not only would it be difficult for a
supranational institution to identify which mergers will amount to a struc-
tural restraint of competition in individuals countries, it is unlikely given
the political value of merger decisions that national politicians would relin-
quish control over such cases. It is much more realistic to expect national
politicians to agree to relinquish control over cases which have no anti-
competitive effect in their territory, but which, because of the nature of the
criteria employed by merger control regimes, must nonetheless be notified
to and reviewed by the regulators. This realistic, relatively modest proposal
72 See J. WILLIAM RowLEY & DONALD I. BAKER, INTERNATIONAL MERGERS: THE
ANITRUST PRocEss (2d ed. 1996) 4; J. William Rowley & A. Neil Campbell, Multi-
Jurisdictional Merger Review - Is It Time for a Common Form Filing Treaty?, POL'Y
DIRECTIONS FOR GLOBAL MERGER REV. 9 (1999).
73See, e.g., the German Law Against Restraints of Competition, supra note 27 at § 103(2)
and the Decision of the Austrian Cartel Court of Dec. 9, 1996, KOG 9.12.1996, 16 Ok 1/95 -
W-GmbH- B1 1997, 185, 190.
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could then perhaps serve as the basis for a much broader international com-
petition law regime.
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